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Introduction 
~;~ chapter focuses on the respective rotes of cognitive 
e~c Ity. and domain-specific knowledge in predicting 
cen~Phonal performance . Since the beginning of this 
ltiectury, educational researchers and psychologists have 
beh ~o locate the sources of outstanding (academic) 
of 1 avt~r and performance. At least two different ways 
'lbckhng this problern can be distinguished . 
&ift de earlier research paradigm explored the impact of ~ee ~ess on exceptional performance. According to this 
in entlf]c approach , generat intellectual abilities assessed 
aca~rly _ childhood or adolescence strongly infiuence later 
l:.ticserntc or professsional performance. As noted by 
the b so~ and Smith (1991), this approach is guided by 
by i aste. belief that behavior is predominantly infiuenced attranh~nted qualities . The paradigm seems particularly 
gene Cttve because of its implicit assumption that only a few 
a lar rat, ba_sic abilities are sufficient to predict and explain 
stuct ge V~ety of specific performances. The longitudinal ColJ; of gifted children carried out by Terman and bis 
Une ~Fes (tobe described below) is representative of this 
A research (cf. Terman, 1925, 1954; Oden, 1968). 
the ~cond , more recent scientific approach differs from 
~ as edness paradigm in that exceptional performance 
Cific surned to be primarily acquired. Accordingly , spe-
e:xte e?ucational experiences and intensive as weil as 
tnin:stve domain-specific training and practice deter-
Cen the acquisition of skill in particular domains. 
apprerat abilities play a minor rote in this explanatory 
199o)ac~ (cf. Anderson , 1990; Ericsson & Crutcher, 
has · Smce the late sixties, the study of expertise 
inrorattr~cted many researchers interested in human 
e~Pe rn_at10n processing. In particular, research on chess 
Sitio~hse has enriched our knowledge about the acqui-
ou181 of ?omain-specific skills and the preconditions for 
Gi~ndmg performance in this domain. 
curre en the popularity of the expertise approach in 
lhe i~t cognitive psychology, the merits of research on 
lletfo Pact of early intellectual ability on later academic 
~Ppr;rnance seem dubious. Proponents of the expertise 
tndivj~ch ( ~.g. , Ericsson & Crutcher, 1990) claim that 
uat differences in intellectual ability do not account 
for much of the variance in exceptional performance. 
Difficulties with evaluating this view are related to the-
oretical problems, that is, problems with defining and 
operationalizing intelligence and cognitive ability. Recent 
reviews on this issue emphasize the fact that research on 
intelligence has abandoned traditional lines, focusing on 
cognitive task analysis, processing strategies and features 
of context (see Ceci , 1990; Gruber & Mandl, 1992) . 
Although there seems to be broad agreement in the 
contemporary Iiterature on exceptional performance 
that the old concept of basic intellectual ability has lost 
its importance and should be replaced by the concept 
of acquired skill, the relationship between cognitive 
ability and the acquisition of expertise has not been 
sufficiently considered in most of these studies. It is the 
major purpose of this chapter to explore this relation in 
more detail. In a first section, developmental research on 
giftedness and its impact on later performance is briefiy 
reviewed. Next, an overview of research dealing with 
expertise in adulthood is provided . After a summary 
of the most important findings , theoretical assumptions 
and models concerning the process of acquiring expertise 
derived from this research with adults will be discussed 
in more detail. In the next section , developmental 
research on knowledge acquisition based on research 
with children will be reviewed. Here , the basic goal 
is to assess the generalizability of findings from work 
with adult experts to child samples and to broaden the 
perspective by adding data from prospective studies 
on the development of expertise to the predominantly 
retrospective inferences of acquisition processes derived 
from studies with adults . In the final section , theoretical 
models are introduced that describe possible relation-
ships between aptitude and the acquisition of expertise. 
Prospective and Retrospective Approaches 
Explaining Giftedness and Exceptional Performance 
Prospective Studies 
As noted above , the well-known Terman Gifted Chil-
dren Study can be conceived of as the most impressive 
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attempt to explore the predictive power of high intel-
lectual ability for subsequent academic performance and 
success in later life. In this study, about 1500 young 
Californian children with an IQ of 135 and above 
were recruited in the early twenties of this century 
and followed up until recently. Although the theoretical 
focus of the study changed over the years, the body 
of data seems suited to evaluate the relevance of high 
aptitude for academic and professional performance. 
At first glance, the findings seem to support Terman's 
expectations: On average, the gifted children performed 
very weil in school and were rather successful in later 
life. However, a closer Iook at the findings revealed that 
the expected collection of "eggheads" and outstanding 
personalities was not found (cf. Sears, 1984). As noted 
by Howe (1982), the data collected by Terman and bis 
colleagues provided little information that would have 
helped one to predict which of the children under 
study would be most successful in later life. Thus 
the conclusion to be drawn from this study is that 
educational achievement and success in life cannnot be 
sufficiently predicted by indicators of high intellectual 
ability measured at an early point in time. 
Further research indicated that the quality of the 
IQ predictor does not change much when aptitude is 
assessed considerably later, that is, du ring the college 
years (cf. Samson, Grane, Weinstein , & Walberg, 1984) . 
In this study, an average correlation of about .15 was 
found between college students' aptitude and their 
professional productivity assessed several years later, 
indicating that the subsamples representing "school-
house giftedness" and "production giftedness" do not 
have much in common (cf. Siegier & Kotovsky, 1986). 
Obviously, information about intellectual ability alone 
does not allow for reliable predictions of later acadernic 
and professional success. 
Retrospective Studies 
Another line of research focused on subjects with 
reliably superior performances, with the goal to recon-
struct their cognitive and noncognitive abilities. Most 
of that research was similarly motivated by the belief 
that exceptionally high Ievels of performance should 
reftect some basic cognitive ability like general intelli-
gence, atttention, or memory (e.g. Cox, 1926). Some 
researchers studied other stable individual character-
istics, such as aspects of personality and motivation 
(Roe, 1952, 1953). In short, the results of these retro-
spective studies seem to confirm the outcomes of the 
prospective studies in that individual differences in 
intellectual abilities did not show up as the crucial 
determinant of outstanding professional careers. For 
example, Roe's analysis of the careers of outstand-
ing scientists showed that noncognitive factors like 
endurance, concentration power and committment to 
work turned out to be more important for profes-
sional success than the individuals' cognitive abilities, 
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despite the fact that the latter were generally above 
average. . 30 More recently, Roe's findings were confirmed tn d 
interview study with excelling scientists, sportsmen.300 
artists organized by Bloom (1985) . The data obtatnert 
from these subjects and their parents did not supp01 the view that outstanding basic abilities were solel 
responsible for success in later life. Instead, the .st~·ii 
provided strong evidence that no matter what the t01\ 
gifts or basic abilities of the individuals, extreme leveot 
of capabilities in their fields of expertise were 0 0• 
attained unless there was a long and intensive pr 111 
cess of encouragement, education and training. Bi0~35 
concluded from these findings that his research ·~ 
raised serious questions about earlier views of. ~pectof 
gifts and innate aptitudes as necessary prerequtsttes 
talent development (1985, p. 3). ·es 
Taken tagether, prospective and retrospective stud~le 
focusing on the impact of intelligence and other sta sS 
cognitive factors on academic and professional succeog 
have been largely unsuccessful in identifying stro 1, 
and replicable relations (see Ericsson & Smith, t99of 
for more evidence on this issue). Instead, rn05110rs these studies have shown that noncognitive facwell 
like motivation, concentration and endurance as 'ble 
as parental and school support systems seem responst 
for exceptional performances in later life. 
Evidence From the Expertise Approach 
Studies With Adult Experts and Novices 
d cted Undoubtedly, the pioneering work on chess con °1973) by de Groot (1946, 1978) and Chase and Sirnon ( 0! 
has stimulated numerous studies on the nature acb 
expertise. Formost cognitive psychologists, an appro ore 
based on acquired characteristics seems much rofor· 
suited to account for outstanding and superior per ble 
mance than research on giftedness relying on 513 ars 
inherited characteristics. The game of chess a~Petbe 
particularly attractive for researchers interested ttl .1 js 
preconditions of outstanding performance because {or· 
rather easy to produce and observe outstanding per e 01 
mance under standardized conditions. One advantagsure 
this game over others is that it is possible to mets 01 
a subject's chess-playing ability from the resu 1 roa· 
matches against different opponents in different to~pef• 
ments (cf. the index developed by Elo, 1978). A~0erit18 
related advantage isthat groups of chess players dtff pesS 
reliably in chess skill can be easily selected .. ~s c 10e 
skill can be measured with remarkable prectstOJl, ired 
domain of chess seems ideal for the study of acq~ced 
skill. Models of chess skill have strongly inftue sicS• 
investigations of expertise in other domains lik.e ph~13ot 
medical sciences, music and sports. The most trnP0 rac· 
findings concerning cognitive and noncognitive cha aitls 
teristics of expertise in chess and these other doCO ver• 
will be discussed below. Before doing so, hOwe 
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rhnera) theoretical and methodological problems with 
e expertiseapproachwill be briefly summarized. 
l>aoBLEMS WITH THE EXPERTISE APPROACH 
bes · · SliJJ Ptte tts obvious advantages, the expertise approach 
is thsuffers from several problems. One of the problems 
defi ~t. the term "expertise" has a nurober of popular 
199 ntttons, which all are somewhat vague (cf. Gruber , 
defil;. ~althouse, 1991). Although the broadly accepted 
Pertnttton that expertise refers to extreme or exceptional 
shou~rtnance implies that the evaluation of expertise 
rath d represent some measure of actual competence , 
arnoer than a possible correlate of competence such as 
an Unt of experience, the categorization of a subject as 
ers~~Pert is still relatively arbitrary given that research-
enc tsagree with regard to the particular Ievel of compet-
to ~ th~t qualifies one as an expert. Although attempts 
novtect~y subcategories of expertise like Iayperson, 
8( 0e, tntermediate, subexpert and expert (cf. Pate! this roen.' 1991) seem to represent an improvement, 
the bclasstfication does not solve the problern because 
lllan oundaries between categories remain unknown. In 
Obv/ ernpirical studies, the definition problern becomes 
eo111 ous when the median of the distribution of a for ~etence measure is taken as the critical boundary 
1\ Xpert-novice distinctions. 
Criti~ n.oted by Ericsson and Smith (1991) , another stanctalts~ue in the expertise approach is how to identify 
ing p ardtzed tasks that will allow the real-life outstand-
Our krformance to be reproduced in the laboratory. As 
~ti nowtedge of complex domains of expertise tike 
it se ng, ~hysics , or medical reasoning is incomplete , 
capt~ms trnpossible to specify a population of tasks to 
in th re such expertise. The problern is also apparent 
desige domain of chess. For example, de Groot (1978) 
nurnbnect the task of selecting the best move for a 
"rea). er of different chess positions in order to simulate 
task Wortd" problern solving behavior. Although the 
the fseems valid at first glance, its problems relate to 
evaluact that it is very difficult-if not impossible-to 
Chess ate t.h~ quality of chess moves for an arbitrary 
lhe" Posthon (cf. Ericsson & Smith, 1991) . Given 
lhe fast nurober of possible sequences of moves and 
Chess~ct t~at chess players employ a wide variety of Sing~e ~~aymg styles, it seems impossible to identify a 
ho~e best" move. Despite these obvious problems, 
to lo Ver.' it should be noted that de Groot was able 
~~~eCalize a few differences in cognitive processes 
1n his en the grand masters and the other dass experts 
best-nstudy by analyzing think-aloud protocols from bis 
~he ta e~t-move task. Although the ecological validity of 
11lu81r 
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re.mains uncertain, it at least can be used to 
less e~t.e dtfferences in thinking processes of more or 
lb tnent chess players. Illern~ same validity problern also holds for the various Vlldo~ tasks repeatedly used in studies of expertise . 
0r reco te?~Y , performance on such tasks (i.e. , recall 
gnttion) is much easier to evaluate than , for 
example, a protocol of thinking processes obtained for 
the next-best-move task. lt is questionable , however, 
whether those aspects of memory assessed in the Iabara-
tory really capture the crucial features of expertise in 
reai-Iife situations. The reader should keep in mind that 
despite the popularity of the expertise approach, these 
problems have not been solved yet. 
PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
EXPERTSAND NOVICES 
In the dassie studies by de Groot (1946, 1978) and 
Chase and Sirnon (1973) , exceptional performance in 
the domain of chess was linked with exceptional memory 
for information related to that domain. In order to 
capture skill differences in chess, de Groot used a 
task that assessed memory for briefly presented chess 
positions. He found that when chess masters were shown 
a chess position consisting of 20-30 pieces for a very 
brief duration (e .g., 5 seconds) , they were able to 
remernher the position far better than less experienced 
chess experts. Chess masters were able to recall the 
positions of all pieces virtually perfectly, whereas the 
positions recalled by the less experienced chess experts 
ranged from 50-70% . 
Chase and Sirnon (1973) followed up de Groot's 
finding that there were major memory differences in 
regard to recatl of briefly shown game positions. They 
added an important control , showing expert and novice 
players also random arrangements of pieces. As the 
experts' advantage in recall with structured positions 
disappeared when random positions were reconstructed, 
it could not be attributed to superior visual short-term 
memory on the part of the experts. 
In order to understand the chess master's recall 
superiority for meaningful chess positions, Chase and 
Sirnon attempted to uncover the structure of his chess 
knowledge. They showed that the recall advantage 
depended on the master's ability to recognize familiar 
pattems or "chunks" . That is, the master was able to 
recall pieces more effectively than the novice because 
groups of pieces , rather than single pieces, formed 
bis chunks. According to this finding, quantitative 
differences in the memory performance of experts 
and novices can be largely explained by qualitative 
differences in memory behavior. 
Research on expert-novice differences in the use of 
complex knowledge in other domains like electronics 
or architecture has also revealed the importance of 
higher-order chunk structures for superior performance 
(cf. Chi , Glaser, & Rees, 1981). Although the notion 
of chunking as a major determinant of expert-novice 
performance differences seems broadly accepted in the 
literature, findings from more recent studies have seri-
ously questioned the assumption that chunking affects 
experts' short-term memory. Carefully designed studies 
of superior memory performance for chess positions 
have shown that experts store information about chess 
positions in Iang-term memory, not solely in short-term 
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(see for a review Charness , 1991). These findings do related to the research on expertise in physics out!'0~5 
not cast doubts on the basic assumption that there are above in that one focus of expert-novice compansoed 
qualitative differences in memory behavior of experts was on reasoning strategies. Pa tel and colleagues 05 re 
and novices . However, they indicate that Chase and a basic experimental procedure where subjects we se 
Simon's (1973) original theoretical assumptions need presented with a written description of a clinical Cllod 
to be replaced by more sophisticated views of skilled and were asked to study the text for a specific pe~' 01 
memory like those by Chase and Ericsson (1982; seealso of time, after which it was removed. The depen ~al 
Ericsson & Staszewski , 1989), stressing the importance measures used in the various experiments on med• tic 
of domain-specific, easily activated retrieval structures in expertise were free recall, diagnosis and diagoos 10 
recall performance. explanation. Diagnostic explanation was included rd 
Qualitative differences in the problem-solving and identify the direction of the reasoning strategy (forWJ10 
memory behavior of experts and novices have also or backward method) . Here , subjects were requeste ·og 
been reported in sturlies dealing with other domains like explain the pathophysiology (causal patterns) underiY' 
physics and medical diagnosis and reasoning (see Anzai, the clinical case. r· 
1991 ; Chi , Glaser, & Rees, 1981; Pate! & Groen, 1986, Based on their fine-grained classification of e~~. 
1991) . Evidence on such differences has been based on tise (i.e., laypersons, beginners, novices , interme~azed 
tasks different from those used in the domain of chess. subexperts and experts), Pate! and colleagues an 1ag· 
Basic differences in problern representations between differences among the subgroups concerning recall , fll 
physics experts and novices were suggested in an experi- nosis and reasoning strategy. When experts and sube~ ce5 
ment by Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981) . Chi et al. were compared on these measures, no recall differeoti~ 
were able to show that experts and novices in phys- were found . Below that Ievel of expertise, substaO t!Jß 
ics differ in their categorization of physics problems: recall differences could be demonstrated (i.e. , tor od· 
Whereas experts classified the problems with respect to novice and intermediate subgroups). On the other ba rtS• 
underlying principles , novices tended to use superficial diagnostic accuracy was considerably higber in the e."~ce, 
meanings of words and diagrams for the purpose of as compared to the subexperts (for confirming evJdevicb• 
classification . Expert-novice differences in the domain see also Lesgold, Glaser, Rubinson, Klopfer, F~)to waS 
of pbysics can also been seen in procedural knowledge & Wang, 1988). In addition, forward reasmung e5 
for problern solving. For example, Sirnon and Sirnon closely related to diagnostic accuracy. Pate! and coUea~ js 
(1978) found blatant qualitative differences in experts' interred from their results that diagnostic accuracrfor· 
and novices' solution processes. That is, experts solved monotonically related to expertise, whereas recall peasoO' 
problems in a "forward" way from the given data to mance is nonmonotonically related to expertise .. Re d a0 
the goal , wbereas novices tried to solve problems in a ing strategies, on the other hand, sbould be cons1dere 1wo 
"backward" way, starting from the goal (e.g., an equa- all-or-none phenomenon that may be related to tbe 
tion containing the unknown of the problem) in search extremes of the expert-novice continuum. .". reol 
for appropriate data to satisfy each subgoal. Although Taken together, research on expertise in du,e ertS 
this finding seems counterintuitive at first glance given domains Iike chess, bridge, music, has shown that e"frofll 
that the novices appear to use the more sophisticated display superior memory performance for stimull 30d 
strategy, there are at least two explanations accounting their domain of expertise when adaptations of Chasefol a 
for tbe experts ' problern solving behavior. The first is Simon's (1973) original procedure have been us~d ~in& 
that experts know that they can achieve the goal simply review, see Ericsson & Srnith, 1991) . Other studJes aJiof 
by direct calculations of the unknowns from the given. the expert-novice paradigm have shown superior re\ct'S 
Another interpretation is that experts do not require domain-related information as a function of the s~b~]U0e 
complex planning for simple tasks. Evidence for this amount of knowledge of the domain. Examples 10 der• 
explanation stems from research showing that experts the domains of haseball and soccer (e.g., Voss, Ves~~g5)· 
change to very sophisticated means-end analyses when & Spilich, 1980; Morris, Tweedy, & Gruneberg, rciOg 
the physics problems become more difficult (Larkin, Most of these studies have found evidence s~PP0131ed 
McDermott , Simon, & Simon, 1980). In summary, a monotonic relation between recall of domam-re b3ve 
the sturlies on expert-novice differences in the domain information and domain-specific knowledge. TheY fll0og 
of physics thus show that the superior performance also supported the view that the main differences a cerO 
of experts on a variety of problern solving tasks is experts and novices in a wide range of domains cons we 
mainly due to the experts' well-organized declarative the speed of access to relevant knowledge as weil a 
and procedural knowledge. As a consequence, perfor- sophistication of knowledge-based strategies. 
mance differences between experts and novices can be 
explained by qualitatively different strategies. 
Further empirical evidence concerning qualitative dif-
ferences in the way experts and novices recall and cam-
prehend domain-related information stems from studies 
on medical expertise (cf. Lesgold, 1984; Pate! & Groen, 
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What do the sturlies on expertise teil us about the; 'J'be 
of basic abilities on exceptional performance · 31ce· 
empirical evidence for such an inftuence is rather sc 
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spare case of exceptional chess performance, superior 
8c 8.
1al ability often was assumed to be important ( Chase 
by ri'on , 1973; Holding, 1985) . However , a recent study 
t:iou oU and Mayr (1987) does not confirm this view. 
Play an~ Mayr compared about thirty of the best chess 
sub·ers m Germany with those of about ninety normal 
subJects of similar ages , using an IQ test with seven 
fou:ales . As a main result , Doll and Mayr (1987) 
hett d no evidence that chess players were selectively 
o1118~r 0~ spatial tasks . In general , the relation of IQ to 
doll! ~ndmg performance seems rather weak in several 
AI~~ns (for a review, see Ericsson & Crutcher, 1990). 
lllajo 0~gh general abilities do not seem to make a 
tbat r d1~ference , the results of several studies suggest 
or b:~eczal abilities like speed of information processing 
diffe Sie memory abilities could be a source of individual 
bas ~ences. Regarding reaction times , for instance, it 
lllore een repeatedly shown that experts are faster and 
e~allliacc~rate than less experienced subjects. A closer 
the v·nat1on of these studies , however, does not confirm 
to ixt;ew that experts outperform novices with regard 
Show ormation processing speed. For instance, it was 
e~Pe n. that experts' superior speed in their domain of 
Silllprhse does not transfer to other tests of speed, like 
kf. s~ reaction times , or to general tests of perception 
Silll~rkes , 1987) . 
Show Llarty , the exceptional memory performance 
dollla~ by many experts for materials from their 
dorna~n does not generalize to materials outside their 
Studi Ln , as demonstrated by Chase and Sirnon (1973). 
have es foc~sing on exceptional memory performance ~orrn descnbed in detail how subjects with initially 
lhr011 a~ memory skill acquired exceptional memory skill 
Stasz; e~tensive practice (cf. Chase & Ericsson, 1982; 
Provitskl ,. 1988, 1990) . In these studies, subjects were 
ciassic e~ ~1th several hundred hours of practice on the 
subje 1 digLt-span task. After 50-100 hours of practice , al>Q11~; were able to increase their digit spans from e~tens · to over 20 digits . Subjects going through a very 
SPans IVfe trainingprogram were even able to attain digit 
li.o o over 100. 
~~lio: .was it possible to acquire this skill? The expla-
~IStan IS that these subjects were experienced long-
llllles c;_runners with a rieb knowledge base for running 
1ec0d·i hey were able to use their knowledge for 
~Cifj ng and interpreting incoming digit sequences as 
Petfore running times . The fact that exceptional memory 
~lllonmance can be successfully trained was further 
altes strated in a recent study by Kliegl, Smith and tolllem(l~86). Kliegl et al. trained young and old adults 
ConcretOnze digits using phonemic recoding of digits into 
llsing 1 e words, which were stored in long-term memory 1hat \V~e ancient "method of loci". It could be shown dralllat~th extensive training, speed of memorization 
Per Sec ICally increased, approaching a rate of 1 digit 
A onct 
s Ccordj · ltatect b ngly, exceptional memory performance dernon-
basie ab~·~any experts cannot be attributed to inherited 1 1hes but has to be conceived of as an acquired 
competency, that is, as an outcome of extensive practice 
and training in the domain of expertise . This competency 
was Iabeted "skilled memory" by Chase and Ericsson 
(1982) who identified three basic principles in the 
acquisition process . First , information is meaningfully 
encoded in terms of knowledge structures in semantic 
memory. Second, retrieval cues are constructed during 
the encoding process , which are explicitly associated 
with the encoded information and can be easily retrieved 
from long-term memory. Third , encoding and retrieval 
processes can be considerably accelerated by extensive 
practice. As a consequence of long training , the speed 
of these encoding and retrieval processes are assumed to 
approach those observed in short-term memory. 
All in all, research dealing with the relevance of bio-
logical dispositions, innate talent and basic abilities for 
exceptional performance has been rather unsuccessful in 
establishing such relationships . The best evidence for the 
importance of inherited characteristics comes from the 
domain of sports, for example, the domains of basketball 
or gymnastics, where anatomical characteristics such 
as height obviously make a difference. For a few 
abilities, such as perfect pitch in music, tapping speed 
in the case of typists and specific abilities revealed 
by children and idiots savants , innate "talent" may 
be a plausible explanation. However, recent research 
on expert performance has convincingly shown that 
exceptional performance in many fields is primarily due 
to a vast body of acquired knowledge and experience 
as weil as to acquired skills (Ericsson, Krampe , & 
Tesch-Römer, in press) . 
What follows from this is that practice plays a crucial 
roJe in the acquisition of expertise . Across a wide 
range of tasks, improvements in performance seem 
closely related to the amount of practice. Reviews of 
skill acquisition indicate that the relationship between 
performance and practice is monotonic (Anderson , 
1982; Newell & Rosenbloom , 1981) and that a power 
function provides a very good fit for a variety of tasks 
and skills. 
However, taking the amount of practice as the only 
important predictor of performance probably aversim-
plifies the problem. Our everyday experiences show that 
not all people practicing and working extensively in a 
specific domain end up as eminent experts in that area. 
Similarly, observations from Iabaratory experiments 
have indicated that providing motivated subjects with 
repeated exposure to a task does not ensure that they 
will attain the highest Ievels of performance on that task 
(Chase & Ericsson, 1981). In particular , inadequate 
strategies often account for suboptimal performance . 
The available evidence indicates that subjects can either 
discover or deduce superior strategies for performing 
tasks, or learn them through instruction . For instance , 
the training study by Kliegl , Srnith, and Baltes (1989) 
showed that subjects were able to improve rapidly and 
attain exceptionallevels of performance only after being 
instructed to use adequate strategies. Thus the amount of 
practice may be a necessary but not sufficient condition 
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for expert-level performance. Obviously, the intensity 
and quality of practice are at least equally important 
in order to reach ambitious goals. Recent theoretical 
models dealing with the acquisition of expertise have 
tried to take these different aspects of practice into 
account. 
Theoretical Models Describing the Acquisition of 
Expertise 
MODELS OF SKILL ACQUISITION 
There have been several models of skill acquisition in 
the Iiterature. The dassie model developed by Fitts 
and Posner (1967) proposed three different acquisition 
stages: The "cognitive stage" can be characterized by an 
effort to understand the task demands and to distinguish 
between important and unimportant aspects of the 
task. The focus is on the acquisition of declarative 
knowledge about the task . The "associative stage" 
involves making the cognitive processes more efficient 
to allow rapid retrieval, thus transforming declarative 
knowledge into procedural forms . During the third and 
final phase, labeled the "autonomous stage" , perfor-
mance is automatic and conscious cognition and control 
is minimal. See Anderson (1982) for a similar theoretical 
model. 
Although these models of skill acquisition have been 
attractive for many researchers in the field, stimulating 
much important research, it remains unclear whether 
the learning mechanisms and developmental stages they 
propose do generalize from adult learners to children. 
We know from numerous reports on the careers of 
chess experts , eminent musicians, or world-class tennis 
players that these individuals have started their careers 
at a very early point in Iife, that is, between 6 and 
10 years of age (e.g. , Bloom, 1985) . We also know 
from several sources that the time between experts' 
first experiences with their domain of interest and 
attaining international-level performance is about 10 
years (Chase & Simon, 1973; Krogius , 1976; Sosniak, 
1985). As pointed out by Ericsson and Crutcher (1990), 
this 10-year rule is supported by data from a wide 
range of domains , including sports , music, chess and 
science. 
Given that the attainment of exceptional performance 
in real life usually takes place in childhood and adoles-
cence, it seems important to identify the Iearning mecha-
nisms, rules of practice and support systems that enable 
thi's rapid development . Recent research conducted by 
Anders Ericsson and his colleagues (Ericsson, 1990; 
Ericsson & Crutcher, 1990; Ericsson, Tesch-Römer, 
& Krampe, 1990; Ericsson et al. , in press) has Ied 
the authors to propose a theoretical framework for the 
acquisition of expert-level performance. The attractive-
ness of this model stems from the fact that hypotheses 
about the developmental history and practice intensity 
of expert-Ievel performers have been systematically 
3i6 
· 0al 
evaluated against empirical evidence on excepttO 
performances in various domains. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FüR ACQUISJ'flg~ 
OF EXPERT-LEVEL PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE 
DELIBERATE PRACTICE 
·tferl 
The model presented by Ericsson and colleagues dt iO 
from the skill acquisition models presented abov.~~iO 
that it explicitly considers developmental iss~e.s wt~85, 
a life-span perspective. Whereas skill acquisttl0~ 015• 
for the most part, been studied with college stu ~jcal 
most information relevant for Ericsson's theore ti~e 
framework stems from Observations and retrosp~c80d 
reports dealing with performances in childhoO 
adolescence. ba~' 
Ericsson and colleagues adopt and extend the toolll 
characteristics of a framework first developed by l3 acb· 
(1985b). Accordingly, the preparation period for ref as 
ing exceptional performance can be conceived 0 st9' 
a sequence of states, each representing rath~f tbe 
ble characteristics for a specific time period 111 tbe 
individual's Iife. The first stage corresponds tod tO 
playful introduction to the domain, the secon 08cb 
the start of systematic practice supervised by a c e to 
or a teacher and the third and most crucial st~g550o 
attaining exceptionallevels of performance ( cf. ErtC 
et al., 1990) . ·ry of 
This model suggests that the type and intenst eotal 
training may differ as a function of develoP~tdreO 
stage. Whereas it is most important to keep ~ht tJ!e 
motivated and interested in the domain dunn; of 
first stage, methods of instruction and the 9ual;~eiS 
teachers become more relevant with increastng reotal 
of performance. An early start as weil as pa 1 (of interest and support seem particularly importan li~e 
the earlier stages. With increasing skill, factors cticC 
availability of excellent instruction, qualitity of pra roost 
equipment and access to practice facilities becorne at ao 
relevant. As noted by Bloom (1985b) , perforf!~ers ucted 
international Ievel have almost always been mst~jeved 
by master teachers who themselves bad once ac 
that Ievel. crolll 
Ericsson et al. (1990) provide multiple evide~ce ccord 
the domains of chess, sports and music that is 10 a b0\I'S 
with the core assumptions of this model and that se~ed 
surprising parallels in developmental pattern~ o~~ datß 
across these domains. For example, the avatlab ti0oal 
indicate that the average starting age for exc~P ro~os 
performers is uniformly young across the three 0 rs oO 
(about 7 years of age), with the best perfor~e·tarlY• 
average having the youngest starting ages. S1111\ tbe 
retrospective estimates consistently showed thaf 3ge 
amount of practice increases as a function °5 tbS
1 
and expertise, regardless of domain . It appear reots• 
systematic practice is most often initiated by P~sitioo 
who very actively support and reward the acqu ro0oo1 
of practice habits. Increases in the weekly aeacbe5 
of practice occur throughout adolescence and r 
'----
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te:ak araund the age of 20. In most studies, the 
~th 7ed amount of practice was often highly correlated 
Ptac/Vels of performance and comparable amounts of 
lllan tce Were reported for subjects of the same perfor-
Coll ce Ievel across domains. The empirical evidence 
&up ected and discussed by Ericsson et al. (1990) not only the~rt~ Bloom's original assumptions but also extends 
So f ndmgs by Bloom (1985b) and his collaborators , in 
Wer:r ~s performers at Ievels below international Ievel 
0 s own to engage in less practice. fotune apparent problern with this account is that it 
Uai ~~g on the extent of practice , although individ-
ObSe 1 erences in the intensity of practice were also 
ai. 0rved. In a more recent review paper, Ericsson et on th Press) take care of this problern in that they focus 
Ptac/ rote of deliberate practice. This term refers to 
belibce activities that aim at maximizing improvement. 
activ ·~rate .practice is conceived of as a highly structured 
able 1 Y Whtch requires effort and is not inherently enjoy-
are ·tn A~cording to Ericsson and Krampe, individuals 
becau Ohvated to engage in deliberate practice only 
Of tno Se practice improves performance, not because 
Br" netary reward. 
Ca! p;c~on and colleagues point to several methodologi-
fotrnao lems involved in demonstrating the fact that per-
tiee. Dce· changes as a consequence of deliberate prac-
for att ~~ng the first decade of preparation necessary 
ltaini ammg exceptional performance, many aspects of 
~ere ~g anct evaluation change. lt is important to note 
Perr0 hat one reason for the difficulty to predict adult USed ~ance from early performance is that the criteria 
~evel 0~ evaluate performance change with increasing 1tl the Performance. For example, whereas beginners 
lechnj domain of music are mainly judged on their 
t1an11 C~l skills , expert adult performers are predomi-
lo eip JUdged on their interpretation and their ability 
Stillila ress emotions through music (Sioboda, 1991). 
Ptodig~ considerations may explain why mathematical 
h Ace Ies ~an be unsuccessful as adult mathematicians. 
. ~ Briordtng to the theoretical framework established 
tn the csso~ and colleagues, other constraints inherent 
~eSour attamment of exceptional performance concem 
uee0 s~es , effort and motivation. In many cases, it has 
and th own that parental support is a major variable 
~eeess at extraordinary commitments by parents may be 
. Uttheary to cope with the demands (cf. Bloom, 1985b). 
~ a frer, as deliberate practice requires effort, fatigue 
Seetos {uent result. The success of deliberate practice 
Ptactic 0 depend on a careful balance of intensive 
0~ del~banct recovery. Disregard of the effort constraint 
1t1Jury 1 erate practice may result in maladaptation, 
11 no1 iand even failure. Finally, as deliberate practice ~as to ~her~ntly enjoyable, the motivational constraint 
0 itnp e gwen special attention. The loss of the goal ~~tern;,ove can have different causes. Problems with 
elllPor Support may be as relevant as problems due to a rt~~liceary Stagnation of performan.ce despite continued 
0lltai st Theseproblems seem parttcularly related to the 
ages of the preparation period and may loose 
their importance when individuals get more involved 
in a domain . As noted by Ericsson et al. (in press), at 
this point the motivation to practice becomes closely 
connected to the goal of becoming an expert performer 
and integrated in the daily routine. 
The framework presented by Ericsson et al. (in press) 
differs from earlier views in that deliberate practice is 
the important factor mediating the observed relation 
between experience, full-time engagement and excep-
tional performance. Accordingly , extended experience 
or practice (the 10-year rule) is necessary but not 
sufficient for attaining the highest Ievels of performance 
in a domain . 
In an attempt to test the validity of this framework, 
Ericsson et al. (in press , Study 1) compared three 
groups of elite, adult violinists regarding their current 
and past Ievels of deliberate practice. The group labeled 
"the best violinists" were rated by music professors as 
having the potential for careers as international soloists. 
The music professors also nominated a second group 
of "good violinists" with less potential but still very 
promising perspectives. A third group of students with 
comparably Iower admission standards were called "the 
music teachers" because teaching was the most likely 
future profession for this group. 
lt was predicted that the highest improvement of 
performance and indirectly the highest attained per-
formance, should be associated with the largest weekly 
amounts of deliberate practice. The assumption was 
that even among individuals with more than 10 years 
of practice, performance should be closely related to the 
amount of deliberate practice. 
The analysis of interview data concerning the amount 
and distribution of deliberate practice confirmed this 
assumption. The best violinists estimated more practice 
hours per week than the good violinists during early 
adolescence and more than the music teachers during 
their entire developmental period. Regarding the diary 
data which included the practice hours for a full week, 
clear differences between the music teachers and the two 
best groups, but no differences between the two best 
groups were found . Also in accord with the expectations, 
the top violinists rated sleep as highly relevant for 
improvement of violin performance . As a matter of 
fact, the two best groups of violinists with the highest 
Ievels of deliberate practice were found to nap more 
in the afternoon than did the group of music teachers. 
All in all , the results of this study are in line with 
the predictions derived from the theoretical framework 
developed by Ericsson and colleagues. 
In their discussion of results, Ericsson et al. (in press) 
emphasize the fact that individual differences in expert 
performances should not be attributed to individual 
differences in natural , innate abilities . Instead, they 
argue that expertise has to be conceived of as the result 
of extensive and intensive practice activities and that 
individual differences in ultimate performance can be 
accounted for by differential amounts of past and current 
Ievels of practice . The claimisthat once individuals have 
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started deliberate practice, it is virtually impossible to 
distinguish the roJe of natural, innate ability from that 
of acquired skill in their current Ievel of performance. 
According to Ericsson and colleagues, it is not the innate 
talent but rather the perception of talent that motivates 
parents to invest time and money to support deliberate 
practice. Needless to say, perceptions of talent should 
not be equated with objective indicators of innate 
ability. 
Although Ericsson et al. 's theoretical framework 
for the acquisition of expert-level performance seems 
impressive and well-suited to account for much of 
the empirical evidence on the causes of exceptional 
performance, one possible problern with the empirical 
evidence described above is that it mostly consists 
of cross-sectional studies predominantly dealing with 
retrospective estimates of past behavior and interview 
data obtained from adults. In our view, prospective 
studies carried out with child experts and novices may 
add substantially to our knowledge about the origins and 
determinants of exceptional performance, particularly as 
far as the roJe of domain knowledge and basic abilities 
is concerned. As a consequence, the empirical evidence 
on determinants of exceptional performance based on 
cross-sectional as well as longitudinal developmental 
studies with child experts and novices will be summar-
ized next. 
Studies With Child Expertsand Novices 
Most developmental studies using the expert-novice 
paradigm focused on the impact of domain-specific 
knowledge on memory. In the field of memory devel-
opment, numerous studies conducted during the past 
two decades have demonstrated the importance of the 
knowledge base for various aspects of memory perfor-
mance (for reviews see Chi & Ceci, 1987; Schneider 
& Pressley, 1989). According to many developmental 
researchers, the knowledge base seems to be one of 
the crucial sources of memory development in childhood 
and adolescence, probably outweighing other relevant 
factors like capacity, strategies, or metamemory ( cf. 
Bjorklund, 1990; Siegler, 1991). Although the nurober 
of developmental studies based on the expert-novice 
paradigm is still small, as compared to the nurober of 
studies on expertise with adults, their findings have 
attracted much attention in the developmental litera-
ture. In the next section, developmental studies focusing 
on the roJe of knowledge will be presented first, followed 
by those studies that explored the importance of basic 
ability in addition to that of the knowledge base. 
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES EXPLORING 
THE IMPACT OF DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE ON 
PERFORMANCE 
From a developmental perspective, the major advantage 
of the expert-novice paradigm is that knowledge and 
chronological age are not necessarily confounded. It is 
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not only possible to recruit adult chess novices ?ut ~~ 
to find young chess experts for experimental studJ_es. 978) dassie developmental study was conducted by Chi (l heSl 
who recruited experienced and inexperienced c rd 
players and gave them Chase and Simon's chess b~30g 
reconstruction task (see above). The most interes ~ge 
aspect of this research was that subjects' knowle tbe 
correlated negatively with age; the children were ain 
experts and the adults were the novices. As a Jllofl' 
result, Chi found that the children's short-term rne:j!S· 
for chess positions was superior to that of the a 11 in 
On the other hand, the typical adult superiortlY ror 
short-term memory capacity could be demonstrated ~n 
the memory span control task, dealing with a _doJilCbi 
(i.e., digits) that adults were more familiar w1th· ofl' 
concluded from her results that short-term rneJilcts' 
capacity was not inherently a function of the subJ~jve 
age, but rather of their knowledge. The most impres 0n 
finding was that the impact of the knowledge base 
recall resulted in a reversal of the typical age effect·Jilail 
From a methodological point of view, both the 50 01 
sample size of Chi's study and the fact that onlY tW ert5 
the four possible groups (i.e., child and adult _e~P30d 
and novices) were included called for a replicat1°0 0tal 
extension of Chi's work. Two subsequent devel?Pm~old, 
studies on chess expertise (Roth, 1983; Opw1s,_ 0ce· Gruber, & Schneider, 1990) found supportive ev•de b~' 
Roth (1983) did not assess memory performance pesS 
tested child and adult experts and novices on a k~0w· 
board comparison task. The magnitude of t~e ·ficanl 
ledge effect was sufficient to eliminate any s1gOI 10er· 
differences between child and adult experts. fu!ro~P 
the knowledge effect accounted for between-age gad~Jt 
differences in that child experts outperformed rceP' 
novices. Thus Roth's findings for the area ofPed for 
tual speed seem to validate Chi's results obtalne 
short-term memory processes. cbild 
In the study by Opwis et al. (1990), groups ofed on 
and adult chess experts and novices were compar ctioC 
various chess board and control board reconstru5joC5 
tasks which included both replications and e~te~rned 
of Chi's original work. The major extension conc 11 rceS 
a procedure that aimed at identifying possible 5~p\l'i~ 
of the experts' superior memory performance. erts 
et al. believed that several aspects like the e"~eces 
greater familiarity with the constellation of chess d 10e1r 
on the board (i.e., meaning of constellations) an chesS 
greater familiarity with the characteristics of theJof of 
board (i.e., geometrical pattern, form and co 30ce· 
chess pieces) all contribute to superior per~or~n tbe 
They expected all these factors to be effecuve ffec15 
meaningful chess board reconstruction task. Th~d~rablJ 
of expertise on performance should be cons• b0ar 
smaller (but still significant) in the ra~dom .111 tbe 
reconstruction task because only familiantY w~ed 1° 
basic charactistics of the chess board was assu ovicesd 
be greater for the experts, as compared to the n rtsan 
Finally, no performance differences between expe uired 
novices were expected for a control task that reCl 
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e tn common with a chess board. 
as l'he results of the study basically confirmed these 
Pesurnptions. Similar to the findings by Roth (1983), no 
1\> rformance differences between adult and child experts 
~re found. Expert-novice differences on the chess 
th arct reconstruction task were most pronounced for 
bu~ rn~aningful chess positions and considerably smaller 
ln Still significant for the random board positions. 
th ;ccord with their hypothesis, Opwis et al. found 
re~ experts and novices did not differ in immediate 
a] onstruction of items on the control board. Opwis et 
0~ ~oncluded from this finding that experts' performance 
the he chess board reconstruction tasks is facilitated by 
tot two context factors described above . Probably due 
fasthese factors, experts are able to process information 
er and in !arger semantic units. C:h~(though the results were inconsistent with those by 
Pr~ 1978) and also Chase and Sirnon (1973) in that no 
Obsnounced expert-novice differences in chunking were 
ana~rved based on inter-response latency measures, the 
in t?Sls of videotapes suggested qualitative differences 
nov· e reconstruction strategies used by the expert and 
ll>ithce groups . While most experts seemed to start 
the th~ reconstruction of specific meaningful units, 
sPe ~VIces focused on aspects like color of pieces or Per~1 c ~ositions on the board. From a developmental 
qulec~IVe, it seems particularly interesting that no 
adu]~tatlVe differences in the strategies of the child and 
1' experts were detected. Stud~ken together, the findings from the developmental 
fro~es on chess expertise corroborate those obtained 
adutt s~udies dealing with expert/novice differences in 
to 8 10 that performance differences can be attributed 
t0 ~a.litative differences in strategic processing. Due 
Ptoc en . rieb knowledge base, child experts seem to 
adut~ss lllformation in a way very similar to that of 
not f experts. Although most developmental studies did 
(i.e ocus on the interplay of knowledge components 
det~' ~eclarative and procedural knowledge) in the 
Stud;nmation of performance, a recent developmental 
1989) On e.xpertise in tennis (McPherson & Thomas, 
and llfrov1des information on this point. McPherson 
(lo._11 °mas compared expert and novice tennis players tenni and 12-13-years-old) on tennis performance and 
1Va8 
8 knowledge. Declarative knowledge about tennis 
ledg:elated to the development of procedural know-
actj0' that is , the quality of decisions and selection of 
age ~s made within the context of agame. Regardless of 
e~p~ Oth knowledge components discriminated between 
tenntts and novices and were significantly related to 
1'h S SkilJ. 
abov~ developmental studies on expertise discussed 
Of do a~I have demonstrated the fast developmen· 
~lose lllatn-specific knowledge in child experts and its 
'ntere relationship to performance in the domain of 
~IQPor~t. However , they do not in form about the relative 
1nctudean~e of ability because this variable was not 
d 1n the design . As a matter of fact, only a 
smaU number of developmental studies considered the 
impact of basic ability intelligence on performance in 
additiontothat of domain knowledge . These studies will 
be summarized next. 
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES EXPLORING THE 
IMPACT OF APTITUDE AND KNOWLEDGE ON 
PERFORMANCE 
A series of developmental studies investigated the 
importance of domain knowledge and general ability 
for processing of text information related to the domain 
of expertise. They can be conceived of as replications 
and extensions of studies on text processing carried out 
with adults. As already mentioned above, Jim Yoss and 
his colleagues (Spilich, Yesonder, Chiesi , & Voos , 1979; 
Voss et al., 1980) had used this paradigm in their studies 
on expertise in baseball. Yoss and colleagues assessed 
subjects' declarative knowledge about haseball in order 
to form groups of haseball experts and novices . Next , 
a passage dealing with a basehall game was presented, 
which had to be recalled some time later. Not surpris-
ingly, the basehall experts recalled more information 
than the novices. The more interesting finding was 
that the quality of experts' and novices' recall protocols 
differed considerably. Whereas the haseball novices 
recalled as much unimportant as important information , 
the experts mostly recalled important information . 
A group of researchers at the Max Planck Institute 
for Psychological Research in Munich adopted this 
paradigm for developmental studies with soccer experts 
(see Körkel & Schneider , 1992; Schneider , Körkel , & 
Weinert, 1989, 1990). More than 500 third , fifth and 
seventh graders participated in this project. According 
to their performance on a questionnaire tapping know-
ledge about soccer rules and important soccer events , 
these children were categorized as either experts or 
novices with respect to soccer. The students at each 
grade Ievel were asked to recall a story about soccer. 
In addition, information about metacognitive knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge about text processing) and subjects' 
intellectual ability was obtained . A second assessment 
using the same instruments followed about a year later. 
The analysis of free recall data yielded significant 
effects of grade and expertise for each measurement 
point. While seventh graders recalled more text units 
than both third and fifth graders, experts outperformed 
novices at each grade Ievel. The findings also confirmed 
Chi's (1978) result in that a reversal of developmental 
trends was demonstrated: third grade experts recalled 
more text information than seventh grade novices. 
The measures of intelligence and metacognitive 
knowledge were included to explore the impact of 
these variables relative to domain knowledge . With 
regard to metacognition , the expectation was that in 
both the expert and novice groups , subjects with high 
metacognitive knowledge on text processing should 
outperform those with low metacognitive knowledge. 
The results clearly confirmed this prediction , indicating 
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that the combination of rieb domain knowledge and 
metacognitive knowledge Iead to optimal performance 
on the recall task. 
The results concerning the impact of general ability were 
different. The experts and novices were classified into 
high-ability and Jow-ability subjects on the basis of their 
performance in the intelligence tests. Thus, four groups 
resulted at each grade Ievel: high- and low-ability soccer 
experts and high- and Jow-ability soccer novices. When the 
longitudinal recall and comprehension data were analyzed 
using grade, expertise and general abilities as independent 
factors, only effects of expertise and grade were found. 
Most strikingly, neither a single effect was found for 
general ability, nor were there any significant interactions. 
Schneider et al. concluded from these findings that rieb 
domain-specific knowledge can sometimes compensate for 
overalllack of generat cognitive abilities. 
As supporting evidence for this has been provided in a 
number of recent studies with children and adults (e.g. , 
Ceci & Liker, 1986; Recht & Leslie , 1988; Walker , 
1987), it appears that individual differences in general 
ability do not make a difference when the task is to 
process new information in a highly articulated domain . 
Piease note that this is also the conclusion Ericsson and 
colleagues have drawn from their research on adult 
expertise. Thus research on exceptional performance 
in adults and developmental studies on text processing 
in child experts and novices Iead to similar insights , as 
far as the role of basic abilities is concerned. 
One problern with the developmental studies on 
the roles of domain knowledge and general ability in 
affecting text processing is that they have been based 
on a small number of tasks and paradigms. The question 
remains whether their main finding concerning the role 
of general ability can be generalized across different 
tasks and domains . A recent study by Schneider and 
Bjorklund (1992) shed some doubts on this assumption . 
Schneider and Bjorklund adopted the basic design used 
by Schneideret al. (1989). However , instead of assessing 
text processing, they tested second and fourth grade 
soccer experts' and novices' performance on a sort-recall 
task dealing with soccer words. 
In accord with their expectations , Schneider and 
Bjorklund found significant effects of expertise on 
recall, thus confirming the results of the previous studies. 
However , soccer expertise did not modify a significant 
effect of IQ Ievel, with high-IQ children recalling more 
than low-IQ children for all contrasts. The results 
thus demoostrate that domain knowledge played an 
important role in children's memory, but could not fully 
eliminate the effects of IQ on sort-recall tasks using 
domain-related materials . That is, although rieb domain 
knowledge seemed to compensate for low aptitude , in 
that low-aptitude experts performed at the Ievel of 
high-aptitude novices , its effects were not strong enough 
to eliminate performance differences between high- and 
low-aptitude soccer experts . 
Schneiderand Bjorklund (1992) concluded from their 
work that the findings from developmental studies 
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dealing with text processing did not generalize to 1~ 
sort-recall paradigm, at least as far as the aspect eO 
general abilitywas concerned. One difference b.etweod 
the text recall task used in the previous studteS 3 ed 
Schneider and Bjorklund's sort-recall task concero 35 
the role of strategies and memory capacity. w~ere r· 
neither strategies nor capacity seem particularly unp0re 
tant in the case of gist recall (text recall), theY. 3d, 
certainly morerelevant when verbatim recall is requtr~og 
as is true for sort-recall. It appears, then , that be110 
an expert does not eliminate the effects attribut~ble te 
individual differences in intelligence when deltbera 
strategies play a role in task performance. . tbC 
One problern with most developmental studies ustng ·se· 
expert-novice paradigm concerns the extent of e~pe~• iO 
For example, no official chess ratings were avaLlab ~·og 
most developmental studies on chess expertise, rna 1 as 
it difficult to judge the competence of child expertseo· 
compared tothat of adult experts. Also, most develop~th 
ta] studies on text processing experienced pro~le~S 00o 
defining expertise. Taking the median of the distnb~t'clll 
of scores in domain-specific knowledge tests as the cn ;teS 
boundary for expert-novice distinctions not o~ly crethat 
the possibility of misclassifications but can also tmplY 
the average Ievel of expertise is rather low. d vel· 
This problern was not an issue in two recent e dge 
opmental studies on the impact of domain knowl~gaO 
and aptitude on domain-specific performance CI-1
1
°993)· & Morgan , 1990; Schneider, Bös, & Rieder.' ded 
which thus will be c?nsidered next. B.oth studies tncl~siOg 
samples of true chtld experts, that ts , young pro~ 5 jO 
subjects with already extraordinary competencte 30·s 
their domain of interest. In Horgan and ~org~ess 
study, official ratings were available for all chtld cf the 
experts (N = 113) . The elite subsample consisted 0
0
1.10g 
twenty best players of this sample. Most of the YrneaO 
elite players badskill ratings of 1300 and more (th~ 30d 
for all U .S. tournament players of all ages is 15 tudY 
the standard deviation is 200). The Schneideret al. ~ of a 
consisted of a reanalysis of data on the developmen agO· 
group of 109 tennis talents collected about 10 years 11ged At the beginning of the study, the children 's age rareeti 
from 10 to 14 years of age. As we know today, the ca M0st 
of most of these tennis talents were very successfu~ roore 
players are stilllisted in the national rankings an toO iO 
than 10% of the sample have made it to the toph besl 
the world, with a few players even betongingtot e 
ten players in the world. . inter· 
Furthermore the two studies seem theoreucallY JO 
esting because' they were longitudinal in natu(~991!l 
their correlational study, Horgan and Morgan dero•' 
examined children's chess records for one ac: eider 
year. The reanalysis of tennis talent data by . Sc 1 
11
1udY· 
et al. (1992) was based on a 5-year longitudtna 5 abil· 
including repeated measurements of basic moto~rniOS 
ities, skill-related . tes~s, psychological te~ts coni~ls 3od 
achievement mottvat10n and concentratwn sk roouo1 
interview data focusing on parental support and a 
of practice. 
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\1& ~~at does the chess study by Horgan and Morgan teil 
ehe ou~ the roles of IQ and experience in developing 
tap 88 Sktll? The elite subsample was given two tasks that 
SkiJfed general abilities and one test of domain-specific 
or i · Th.e Raven's Matrices testwas used as a measure 
logttelhgence because it was considered a measure of 
feit~~ abilities as weil as spatial abilities . The authors 
ehes at the type of reasoning required was similar to 
colll~ .reasoning . In addition, a Piagetian task measuring 
the 1t~tory logic in formal reasoning was used. Finally, is b rntght's Tour, that is , a chess-specific test that 
Ptov~dteved to be closely related to chess skill was 
' ed on;~ on~ main result of the longitudinal study based 
Ches e t?tal sample , it was shown that improvement in 
Usins Sktll was significantly correlated with experience. 
~or g age and pretest ratings as covariates, Horgan and 
e~Peg~n could demoostrate a close relationship between 
ratin nence in terms of games played and posttest chess 
and g. In sum, the more improved players played more 
Won m 1\ct . . ore. 
for thdttlo.nal stepwise regression analyses carried out 
acco e eine subsample showed that pretest chess skill 
Ches~nt~d for about 65% of the variance in post-test 
tor 
1 
Sktll. When the Raven's testwas added as a predic-Varia~~ ~mount of variance explained in the dependent 
'~~ere e lncreased to 77%. Another 10% of the variance 
&allle accounted for by the addition of numbers of 
6ndi 8 Played. Horgan and Morgan concluded from this 
Signi~g that both experience and nonverbal intelligence 
1\s th ca~tly contribute to improvements in chess skill . 
'~~ith ~ Ptagetian task showed no significant correlation 
the 1~ ess skill in the young elite players, it appears that 
'llake Pe ~f reasoning assessed in general ability tests 
Ons an tmportant difference in this regard. 
'~~aste of the goals of the study by Schneideret al. (1993) 
lha1 1~ lest Ericsson and Crutcher's (1990) assumption be &e e ba~ic findings concerning expertise in chess can 
Partie nerahzed to other domains, including sports. In 
estjlll ul.ar, the reanalysis of tennis talent data aimed at 
lenni~tlng ~he relative impacts of basic motor ability and 
~illect spectfic skills on performance in tennis , as indi-
tneluct by national rankings . Indicators of motor ability 
hke 81e.d assessments of sprint ability , whereas measures '~~ere ttng-frame bouncing tests and target hitting tests 
viltiab~Sed. to tap tennis-specific skills . In addition, 
Ptactj es hke parental support, estimated intensity of 
'~~ere ce, achievement motivation and concentration skill 
con .d ~e SI ered in the analyses. lenni~~lts ~f causal modeling procedures showed that 
the te 8P~ctfic skills explained most of the variance in 
Ongit 0~1S rankings obtained for the last year of the 
ilnct p\idtnal study (1982). Similarly, intensity of practice 
enildr ar~ntal support during the early stages of the 
tilllki~n s tennis career significantly predicted the tennis 
!>error gs. The impact of basic motor ability on tennis 
ts, l\<h lllance was comparably small but reliable. That 
'llacte~n the basic ability construct was omitted from the 
' 1t no Ionger fitted the data. The same pattern of 
results emerged when tennis rankings obtained 7 years 
later were used as the dependent variable. Raukings 
obtained in 1982 and in 1989 correlated with r = .70, 
which indicates high stability of individual differences in 
tennis skill during adolescence and early adulthood. 
Taken together, the findings by Horgan and Morgan 
(1990) and Schneider et al. (1993) basically confirm 
the theoretical framework developed by Ericsson and 
colleagues. They all highlight the importance of delib-
erate practice in developing domain-specific expertise 
in children. The results provided by Schneider et al. 
additionally prove the significance of parental support 
systems for skill development. However, both studies do 
not support the assumption that individual differences in 
basic ability can be completely neglected when it comes 
to predicting the development of expertise. In the case of 
chess expertise, intelligence as measured by the Raven's 
test accounted for a small but significant amount of 
variance explained in the dependent variable, that is, 
improvement in chess skill within a year. Similarly, the 
study by Schneideret al. showed that the relative impact 
of basic ability on performance was small but reliable . 
This finding seems particularly impressive given that 
the basic abilities found for the two elite samples in 
chess and tennis were clearly above average and that 
the range of scores was small due to the homogeneity 
of the samples. The results of these studies thus seem 
to indicate that experience, while extremely important , 
cannot completely substitute talent. As emphasized by 
Horgan and Morgan, no amount of experience will 
make an ordinary player into a grandmaster. Thus the 
message is that one should come up with models of 
skill acquisition that account for possible influences of 
individual differences in cognitive abilities . Theoretical 
models including the basic ability component will be 
discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been shown that exceptional 
performance usually is based on an extremely rich 
knowledge base , acquired through a very long Iasting 
process of motivated learning. In order to reach this 
point, cognitive personality characteristics like high 
intellectual ability seem less important than noncognitive 
factors like endurance, dedication, concentration and 
motivation. The most important accomplishment of the 
skilled memory theory was to highlight and demoostrate 
the relevance of acquired skills in explaining exceptional 
performance . The findings by Ericsson and colleagues 
even suggest that individual differences in basic abilities 
can be ignored in view of the overwhelming effects of 
expertise on performance. However , one problern with 
most of the studies on adultexpertisewas that individual 
differences in basic abilities were not explicitly meas-
ured . Given the evidence from developmental studies 
on expertise which took those abilities into account, 
one is inclined to believe that the impact of innate , basic 
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abilities should not be completely ignored in theoretical 
models dealing with the acquisition of expertise. But as 
even the developmental studies do not show substantial 
inftuences of high ability or talent, one can easily accept 
that the original approach of prospective research in 
giftedness outlined above does not pay off in the long 
run. In most theoretical models relating giftedness to 
exceptional performance, the impact of early basic 
abilities on performance later in life has been largely 
overestimated. 
On the other hand, it does not seem to require 
much effort to change developmental models derived 
from giftedness research into models compatible with 
the expertise approach. For example, Renzulli's (1986) 
three-ring model of giftedness includes several compo-
nents highly important for the acquisition of expertise. 
According to Renzulli's model, aptitude, creativity and a 
motivationplus context component determine giftedness 
or talent . If one replaces talent by exceptional perfor-
mance and also gives a low weight to the aptitude and 
creativity factors, as compared to the motivation and 
context factor, one only needs to add a big knowledge 
component in order to be in line with core assumptions 
of the expertise approach. 
Another modification of the theoretical framework of 
expert performance was suggested by Schneider (1988, 
1992). Schneider emphasized the fact that most studies 
in adult expertise dealt with subjects of at least average 
intelligence (e.g., physics professors, chess players). He 
voted for a "threshold" model of exceptional perfor-
mance that can be described as follows: lf the ability 
parameter of a subject is close to or beyond a critical 
or "threshold" value of ability (typically assumed to 
be slightly above average), then individual differences 
in noncognitive variables like commitment, endurance, 
concentration, or motivation decide about peak perfor-
mance. In this case, it does not matter at all whether 
the subject is gifted or only of normal intelligence. 
Although this model appears intuitively plausible, one 
of its problems lies in the definition of critical or 
"threshold" scores for different domains (cf. Weinert, 
1992) . The boundaries may be weil above average for 
domains/tasks where complex problern solving activities 
and strategy utilization are necessary components and 
may be clearly below average for less complex domains 
or tasks that mainly rely on automatical processes ( e.g., 
pattern recognition processes or text processing). 
Another model concerning the acquisition of expertise 
and including ability components was developed by 
Ackerman (1987). Following the theoretical assump-
tions of Fitts and Posner (1967), Ackerman assumes 
that three stages of skill acquisition can be distinguished: 
a first cognitive stage deals with the acq uisition of 
declarative knowledge. This is followed by an associative 
stage, where elements of declarative knowledge are 
composed into !arger units and procedural knowledge 
is gradually acquired and improved. Although the final, 
automatic stage of skill acquisition does not differ from 
the second as far as qualitative aspects of information 
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processing are concerned, its unique features rna~~~~ 
seen in increased, optimal speed of processing as V:~ 
fine-tuned and automatized problern solving activtues;1. 
According to Ackerman (1987, 1988), different ahed 
tudes are necessary to master the three stages de~c~d~al 
above. Regarding the first cognitive stage, indtVt 05t 
differences in generat intellectual ability seem tobe 01 of 
important. That is, the higher the generat intelligencet a 
an individual, the faster declarative knowledge ab0~0d , 
specific domain should be acquired. During the seco ear 
associative stage, indicators of perceptual speed apP of 
to be particularly important for combining e!ernentsral 
declarative knowledge and initializing the procedOsiP 
knowledge component. Finally, individual difference jpg 
psychomotor abilities seem most relevant for rnastef 
the stage of automatization. . .d0al 
This model suggests that the impact of indtVI ceSS 
differences in basic intellectual abilities on th~ pros~P' 
of s~ill acquisition dim!nishes as a function of t~rne· frofll 
portmg evtdence for thts assumption can be denved IiP8 
experiments conducted by Ackerman (1988, de\gs 
with a variety of cognitive tasks. Although these ~ndt the 
confirm Ackerman 's core assumption concern•.ng the 
changing roJe of basic intellectual abilities dunng tear 
process of skill acquisition, it still remains unc010r 
whether the roJe of perceptual speed and psych001wide 
ability components can be generalized across a 
variety of domains . 
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